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Duckworth v. Eagan: A Little-Noticed
Miranda Case That May Cause Much
Mischief
By Yale Kamisar*
Professor Yale Kamisar, the country's foremost scholar of
Miranda and police interrogation, presents an analysis and critique
of the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of Miranda. In Duckworth, a 5-4 Court upheld the "if and when" language systematically used by the Hammond, Indiana, Police Department: "We
have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for
you, if you wish, if and when you go to court."
The real issue was whether the police effectively conveyed the
substance of a vital part of Miranda: the right to have a lawyer
appointed prior to any questioning. Professor Kamisar argues that
the language upheld is unnecessarily confusing and misleading and
that the best explanation for the Hammond police's continued use
of this language is that it lessens the likelihood of an assertion of
rights.

Duckworth v. Eagan, 1 the only significant Miranda decision
the United States Supreme Court handed down during its 19881989 term, has gone largely unnoticed. It is not hard to understand why.
The opinion was announced the same day the Court decided
two death penalty cases the press considered much more newsworthy.2 Moreover, Duckworth was decided only five days after
the Court overturned Gregory Johnson's flag-burning conviction3-and at a time when most of the country was still in
white heat over that event. Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who wrote the opinion of the Court in Duckworth, gave the im* Henry K. Ransom Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School;
author, Police Interrogation and Confessions: Essays in Law and Policy (1980). An
earlier and shorter version of this commentary appeared without footnotes in Legal
Times, July 24, 1989 at p. 25.
1

109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989). Chief Justice Rehnquist spoke for a 5-4 majority (Marshall, joined by Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
2
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989). (Eighth Amendment does not
categorically forbid execution of the mentally retarded); Stanford v. Kentucky, 109
S. Ct. 2969 (1989) (state may execute 16- and 17-year-old offenders).

3

Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
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pression that the case was relatively unimportant and the result
reached quite predictable.
Most journalists completely overlooked Duckworth. The
few who gave it some coverage treated the case much as its
author seemed to regard it-both as an insignificant case
reaffirming the view that "the 'rigidity' of Miranda warnings
[does not] extend to the precise formulation of the warnings
given a criminal defendant,' ' 4 and as a case upholding the warnings, although they were not "in the exact form" described in
the Miranda opinion, because "in their totality" they satisfied
Miranda. 5
Duckworth is, in fact, a much more significant and troublesome case than its neglect by the press suggests and a majority
of the Court would have us believe. The issue presented was
not whether a "talismanic incantation" of the Miranda warnings is required. 6 Of course it is not. 7 Rather, it was whether the
substance of an important feature of the Miranda warnings4

109 S. Ct. at 2879, (quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (per
curiam), discussed in note 12 infra).
5

109 S. Ct. 2879, 2881.

6

The Duckworth majority recalled that the Court pointed out in California v.
Prysock (discussed in note 12 infra) that "no talismanic incantation [of the Miranda
warnings is] required to satisfy its strictures." /d. at 2879.
7
Although it is sometimes said that every schoolboy knows the Miranda warnings by now, it is perhaps more accurate to say that, although many schoolboys are
familiar with the first part of the Miranda warnings (just as they are familiar with the
first stanza of the "Star Spangled Banner"), a good number of schoolboys and adults
do not have a firm grasp of all four elements or subwarnings. They are:
1. You have the right to remain silent;
2. Anything you say can and will be used [or simply "can be used" or "may be
used"] against you;
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and to have him present with you while
you are being questioned [or "you have the right to talk to a lawyer before you
are questioned" or "you have a right to talk to a lawyer before we ask you any
questions, and to have him with you during the questioning"]; and
4. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any
questioning if you so desire [or "if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be
provided for you prior to any interrogation" or "if you cannot afford a lawyer,
and you want one, we will see that you have one provided to you free of charge
[without charge] before we ask you any questions"].

As the bracketed variations indicate, the warnings need not be given in the exact
form described in the Miranda opinion. Indeed, the warnings are not described exactly the same way throughout the opinion. But while there is some room for variation in the warnings, as long as the substance of each warning is given effectively, the
range of variation permitted is (or at least used to be) rather narrow.
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the right to have a lawyer appointed prior to any questioningwas ever effectively conveyed to the defendant. A reading of
the majority opinion leaves one with the conviction that the
Court dealt Miranda a heavy blow.
Did the Warnings Satisfy Miranda?

When respondent Eagan agreed to go to Hammond, Indiana, police headquarters for questioning about his possible
involvement in a murder, a station-house officer read a waiver
form that departed from the standard Miranda warnings. The
form provided, inter alia:
You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any
questions, and have him with you during questioning. You have the right
to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire
one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed
for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer
questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering
at any time until you've talked to a lawyer. 8

In 1972, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had
disapproved a virtually identical Miranda warning, finding it
"misleading," "confusing," and "contradictory. " 9 When, in
1987, the Duckworth case came before it on federal habeas corpus, the court of appeals saw no reason to stray from its earlier
analysis: "The 'internal inconsistencies' inherent in this type of
warning are no less ambiguous and misleading than they were
fifteen years ago. " 10
When the Duckworth case reached the Supreme Court,
however, a 5-4 majority, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, gave the
challenged warning a more sympathetic reading. After dissecting the language quoted above, the majority concluded that the
warnings "touched all of the bases required by Miranda. " 11
On the contrary, the warnings missed one base-and by a
substantial margin. 12 According to Miranda, "if police propose
8

ld. at 2877 (emphasis added by the Supreme Court).

9

United States ex rei. Williams v. Twomey, 467 F.2d 1248, 1250.

10

Duckworth v. Eagan, 843 F.2d 1554, 1557 (1987).

11

109 S. Ct. at 2880.

12

Although the Duckworth majority would have one believe that the result in that
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to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is
entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer
will be provided for him prior to any interrogation. " 13 But the
police told Eagan, in effect, that if he could not afford a lawyer,
one would not be-indeed, could not be-provided for him
" prior to or during any questioning.
To be sure, Eagan was told at the very outset that he had a
right to talk to a lawyer before the police asked him any questions. But taking into account what he was told in the next
breath, Eagan might plausibly have concluded that, since indigent persons like him had no way of getting a lawyer at this
stage, there was no point in asking for one. (Wasn't that what
the police wanted him to think?)
Eagan was also told, at the end of the reading of the waiver
form, that he had "the right to stop answering questions at any
time" until he talked to a lawyer. But that piece of advice was
case follows easily from the decision in Prysock, the warnings upheld in that earlier
case presented a much closer question. Respondent Prysock was informed that he
had "the right to talk to a lawyer before you are questioned, have him present with
you while you are being questioned, and all during the questioning." He was then
told: "[You] have the right w have a lawyer appointed to represent you at no cost to
yourself.''
It may not have been as clear to Pry sock as it should have been that he had a right
to appointed counsel before and during questioning. Arguably, however, he could
have reasonably concluded that the very explict and emphatic general advice about
his right to a lawyer "before" and "while" and "all during the questioning" applied
and was meant to apply to his right to have a lawyer appointed to represent him if he
could not afford one.
In Duckworth, however, the suspect was not left to wonder whether the general
advice about the presence of counsel applied to his right to appointed counsel. There
was no ambiguity about when a lawyer would first be available for him. He was told
explicitly and emphatically that a lawyer would not be available in the station house,
that one would not be appointed for him until he went to court, and that there was
"no way" he could get a lawyer until then. See text at note 8 supra.
Moreover, the police in the Prysock case arguably got into difficulty because, in
addition to informing the suspect of his standard Miranda rights, they were trying to
inform him, a minor, of his special rights, i.e., the right to have his parents present
during the questioning (which they were). The logical time to advise a suspect of his
right to be provided a lawyer free of charge before he is questioned is right after he
has been given his general advice about counsel. But this is also a natural or logical
time to tell a minor that he has the right to have his parents, as well as a lawyer,
present. This is what occurred in Pry sock. At the very point one would have expected the police to inform defendant of his right to appointed counsel prior to and
during questioning, they informed him, instead, of his special right as a minor to have
his parents present before and during any questioning. Thus, it may be said, the
police broke the normal flow of the Miranda warnings for good cause.
13
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) (emphasis added). To the same
effect, see id. at 473, 479.

553

CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN

colored by the information preceding it that implied there was
no way Eagan would be able to talk to a lawyer during his stay
in the police station; he would not get the oppportunity to talk
to a lawyer until he went to court.
Under the circumstances, Eagan might easily have concluded that he would look silly asking the police to stop
questioning him until he talked to a lawyer. The police would
have wondered whether he had been listening to them. What
was the point of asking the police for a lawyer now, when the
police had just finished telling him there was no way he could
get one at this time? After all, as the Duckworth dissenters
pointed out, Eagan was never told, nor given any reason to believe, that if he wanted a lawyer appointed for him the questioning would be delayed until one was made available. 14
Of course, if Eagan were a smart, sophisticated fellow, he
might have dissected the Hammond police warning the way
Chief Justice Rehnquist did and figured out that he could stop
the questioning-indeed, prevent it from ever getting underway-simply by asking for a lawyer, even though there was
no way he could actually get one at the time. But the Miranda
warnings weren't designed for smart, sophisticated people.
(Such people probably don't need the Miranda warnings.) The
warnings-at least the ones described in the Miranda opinionwere constructed for not-so-smart, not very sophisticated people. Such people need to be, and are supposed to be, "clearly
inform[ed]" of their right to appointed counsel. 15 "Only by
effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right
can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise
it.'' 16 Eagan was given no such explanation.
The Miranda warnings are designed to "dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings. " 17 How is that goal advanced by informing a suspect that ''we have no way of giving
you a lawyer" before (or during) custodial interrogation? The
Miranda warnings are supposed to assure an indigent that he,
no less than a wealthy person, "has a right to have counsel
14

See 109 S. Ct. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

15

384 U.S. at 471.

16

Id. at 458 (emphasis added).

17

Id. at 458. To the same effect, see id. at 465, 468.
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present. " 18 How is an indigent given that assurance by being
told that if he cannot afford a lawyer there is no way to implement his right to have counsel present?
"Anticipating" a Suspect's Questions

Chief Justice Rehnquist would say that this analysis is unfair
to the police. He saw nothing sinister about the "if and when
you go to court" sentence. That information, he said, "simply
anticipates" a question a suspect might ask: When will I actually get a lawyer? After all, the information the police supplied "accurately described the procedure for the appointment
of counsel in Indiana.'' 19
The difficulty with this sanguine view of the matter is that
there are a great many questions a suspect might ask the police:
Do you have any witnesses to the crime? Did my friend confess? Will I get a heavier sentence if I'm convicted later because
I refused to ''cooperate'' with you?
If it is the truth, may the police inform a suspect while they
are giving him the Miranda warnings that two eyewitnesses
have identified him as the bank robber? If it is the truth, may
they tell a suspect between the second and third warning that
his accomplice has "cracked" and implicated him? If it is an
"accurate description" of the practice in that jurisdiction-and
it may well be-may the police tell a suspect between the first
and second warning that if he refuses to talk to them and is
subsequently covicted he will get a heavier sentence? In each
case, couldn't the police say that the additional information
they provided "simply anticipated" a question the suspect
might have asked?
One sympathizes with a police officer who has to make a
split-second decision: Am I justified in shooting at (or what
appears to be) that fleeing robber in order to prevent his escape ?]o Do I have sufficient grounds to arrest (or even to ''stop'')
1
~ ·'The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that
would convey to the indigent ... the person most often subjected to interrogationthe knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present. ... [O]nly by effective
and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be any assurance that
he was truly in a position to exercise it." /d. at 473.

19

109 S. Ct. at 2880.

20 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989) (claims under 42
U .S.C. § 1983 that police officer used excessive force should be analyzed under
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that suspicious fellow lurking in an alley a block away from
where a woman is screaming?
But it is hard to have any sympathy for a police officer who
tries to play fast and loose with the Miranda warnings, or a
police department, such as Hammond's, that continues to use
variations on the Miranda warnings a decade after these very
formulations have been discredited by the federal court of appeals for the circuit.
An officer does not have to give the Miranda warnings until
the situation is under control and the suspect is in custody. Nor
does he ever have to give them unless he plans to interrogate
the suspect. If an officer does not carry a Miranda card or know
the Miranda warnings after all these years, what does he know?
And if an officer is willing to give the warnings, a relatively
simple procedure, the way they were described in Miranda,
what other less rigid rules is he prepared to fudge?
Are Miranda Warnings Ever "Inaccessible"?

Chief Justice Rehnquist does not think it's nearly that simple. An officer "in the field," he notes, "may not always have
access to printed warnings'' or may ''inadvertently depart from
routine practice, particularly if a suspect requests an elaboration of the warnings. " 21
What bearing do these observations have on a case such as
Duckworth where the officer was not ''in the field,'' but at
police headquarters? What relevance do these observations
have when, as in Duckworth, the suspect did not ask for any
elaboration of the warnings and an entire police department
(which composed and continued to use the challenged warnings), not an individual officer, departed from the standard
warnings?
Moreover, and more fundamentally, what does it mean to
say that the printed Miranda warnings may be "inaccessible"?
One can understand how a magistrate may be inaccessible-but
the Miranda warnings? How much effort does it take to
Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard rather than under the
more generalized standard of substantive due process): ''The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.''
21

!d. at 2879-2880.
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memorize the warnings or, if one's memory is weak, to carry a
Miranda card? What does a Miranda card weigh? How much
room does it take? The Chief Justice writes as if each of the four
warnings is inscribed on a separate heavy stone tablet and a
given police department only has one set.
A Fragile System

A quarter of a century ago, on the eve of Miranda, Professor
Edward Barrett asked: ''Is it the duty of the police to persuade
the suspect to talk or to persuade him not to talk? They cannot
be expected to do both.' ' 22
Is there any doubt about what police officers think their superiors expect them to do? Who has ever heard of a police commissioner congratulating the officer in charge of a murder case
for giving the Miranda warnings so carefully and so emphatically that the suspect asserted his rights and never said a word
about the case?
That is why a system, such as the one we have, that allows
the police to obtain waivers of a person's constitutional rights
without the presence of any disinterested observer, or any other
objective record of the proceedings, is an inherently fragile one.
Despite its shortcomings, such a system may work tolerably
well-but only if the police adhere strictly to the standard
Miranda warnings.
If police departments or individual officers are allowed to
"improvise," if they are permitted to "anticipate questions" a
suspect might ask, the system will collapse. For the police will
only "improvise" in one direction. And they will only anticipate questions the answers to which further their interests, not
the suspect's.
This must be said not because the police are more dishonest
than the rest of us. Rather, they are no less human than the rest
of us-no less inclined to further their own interests if given the
leeway to do so.
Should the Police Have Anticipated Other Questions?

One need go no further than the Duckworth case to illustrate
the point. The police anticipated a question the answer to which
22
Brief of Edward L. Barrett, Jr., as amicus curiae, at 9, People v. Dorado. 62
Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965) (on rehearing).
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could only have made it less likely that Eagan would assert his
right to appointed counsel. But the police could have reasonably anticipated another question: "If, as you just told me, you
cannot give me a lawyer now, what happens if I ask for one
now?"
The truthful answer to that question would have been: ''If
you ask for a lawyer now, then we would be very restricted as
to how we could proceed. We could have to cease questioning
on the spot. And we could not resume questioning at a later
time, even if we gave you a fresh set of Miranda warnings. We
could not talk to you any more about this case unless and until
you changed your mind about wanting a lawyer and you yourself initiated further communication with us. " 23
Why didn't the Hammond police anticipate that other question? Because the answer to it would have made it more likely
that Eagan would have asserted his right to appointed counsel. 24
Other examples come readily to mind. A suspect may wonder whether, if he neither writes nor signs anything, his conversation or small talk with the police can be used against him.
He may very well think that it cannot be. Will his interrogators
anticipate his confusion and uncertainty in this regard and clarify the matter? Will they inform him, as the Uniform Rules of
Criminal Procedure recommend, that anything the suspect tells
them "orally or in writing, will be used against him"? 25 Why
would they? That would only "help" the suspect.
A person taken into police custody may wonder whether his
silence can be used against him. He may be asking himself most
urgently: "How can I avoid looking guilty unless I agree to talk
23

See generally Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (!981).

24

As between the two questions that might have been anticipated, the one about
what consequences flow from the assertion of the right to counsel is more important.
Under the Miranda system, when a suspect gets a lawyer doesen't matter nearly as
much as whether he asks for one. Once he does, additional safeguards are triggeredregardless of how long it takes for a lawyer to actually become available. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
The police know or ought to know that asking for a lawyer significantly reduces
their maneuverability. Once a request for counsel is made the police must not only
back off immediately, but they cannot try again at a later interrogation sessionunless the suspect initiates further communication with them. The last thing the
police want a suspect to do, therefore, is to ask for a lawyer. It follows that the police
are not eager to explain a suspect's right to appointed counsel unequivocally, plainly,
and emphatically. If the courts do not require them to do so, why bother?
25

Unif. R. Crim. P. 212 (b) (emphasis added).
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to the police?" 26 Will his interrogators anticipate that question
and inform him that if he goes to trial the prosecution will not be
able to comment on the fact that he asserted his rights and remained silent when given the Miranda wamings? 27 Why would
they? That, too, would only help the suspect.
A suspect may be wondering whether his spouse or parents
retained a lawyer on his behalf and whether that lawyer is trying
to see him. The police need not give a suspect that information
if he does not ask for it/8 but they could anticipate such questions-especially if they know a lawyer is trying to see the suspect. Will they do so? Why? Providing such information would
encourage a suspect to assert his right to counsel. What police
interrogator worth his salt would do that?
Suppose, as they are about to arrest a suspect and take him
to the station house, the police overhear the suspect asking a
friend or relative to get him a lawyer. Suppose further that no
lawyer comes to the station house or calls the police on the
suspect's behalf. Can the police tell the suspect that? Why not?
Wouldn't such information anticipate a question the suspect
might ask and wouldn't it be an "accurate description" of what
had transpired?
Are the police, and should the police be, free to anticipate
questions they would like to answer and free not to anticipate
those they would rather not answer? The Duckworth case need
not be read that broadly, but it is certainly a giant step in that
direction-a step the Court should have blocked.
26

The Miranda opinion points out, 384 U.S. at 468, that many suspects will assume that "silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when
presented to a jury.'' The opinion then informs trial judges and prosecutors that a
suspect's "[standing] mute or claiming his privilege in the fact of accusation" may
not be used against him at trial. Id. at 468 n.)7. But nowhere does the Miranda
opinion require that a law enforcement officer advise a suspect to this effect. See
generally Elsen & Rosett, "Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona,"
67 Colum. L. Rev. 645, 654-655 (1967).
27

.
Statements obtained from a suspect in violation of Miranda may be used to
1mpeach him if he takes the stand in his own defense. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 _(1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). Moreover, if a suspect has not been
adv1sed of his rights, his post-arrest silence may also be used for impeachment purposes. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (per curiam). But if he has been given
the M_iran~a warnings, a suspect's silence may be used neither in the prosecution's
case-m-ch1ef nor for impeachment purposes.

~oran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). However, if a suspect specifically asks
the pohce whether a lawyer is trying to reach him and the police know that one is
this author believes the police must so inform the suspect.
'
28
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Continued Use of the Challenged Warnings

How seriously should one take the State of Indiana's contention that despite the "if and when you go to court" language,
the Hammond police warnings "in their totality" are "a fully
effective equivalent'' of the standard warnings? 29
If this were really so, why didn't Indiana law enforcement
officials avoid litigation by discarding this type of warning and
reverting to the standard form? Why didn't they accept the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit in 1972 that the "if and when you
go to court" language fatally taints the warning? Why did they
persist in fighting the issue all these years?
These questions were not easy for the state to answer. Indeed, at one point in the oral arguments before the Supreme
Court, Indiana's lawyer conceded that the continued use of the
"if and when you go to court" language ''makes no sense. " 30
One must conclude that the continued use of this offending
language does make sense-and it .only makes sense-if it gives
the police certain advantages not provided by the standard
warnings. It is the state's argument-its insistence that the
challenged formulation is essentially no different than the warnings described in Miranda-that makes no sense.
The best explanation for the failure of the Hammond police
to abandon their version of the warnings in favor of the more
common variety is the belief, and a well-founded one, that their
formulation tends to confuse unsophisticated indigent suspects
and tends to induce them to forgo the right to counsel at the
critical moment. The Hammond police continued to use warnings disapproved by the federal court of appeals for their circuit, and the state's attorneys continued to defend their use,
because these warnings give law enforcement officials an
advantage the Miranda Court never would have allowed-and
because they hoped (perhaps expected) that a "new" Court,
one not enamored of Miranda, would let them get away with it.
Last term their hopes were fulfilled. What now?
29

Of course the Duckworth majority bought this argument. The phrase "a fu"lly
effective equivalent," quoted in Duckworth, comes from Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476:
"The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion
today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the
admissibility of any statement made by a defendant."
30

See 45 Crim. L. Rep. 4009, 4010 (April 12, 1989).
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What Message Has the Court Sent the Police?

If a police officer wanted to minimize the impact of the
Miranda warnings, Duckworth would exhilarate and inspire
him. He would read the case as putting each of the four warnings up for grabs.
Many new versions of the Miranda warnings are likely to
emerge (and some once-disapproved formulations are likely to
resurface). To take but one example, the standard form of the
second warning is that "anything you say can and will [or may]
be used against you." In the years immediately following
Miranda, however, the Philadelphia police tried to blunt the
second warning as much as possible by advising suspects that
anything they said could be used "for or against" them. 31 The
state supreme court didn't let them get away with that. It invalidated the formulation because it was ''likely to undercut the
effect of the [Miranda] warning by offering an inducement to
speak. " 32
Now that Duckworth is on the books, that once-discredited
version of the second warning (along with sundry variations of
other warnings) is likely to appear again. Will the new Court
uphold the old Philadelphia warning? It is no longer clear that it
will not. After all, isn't the formulation literally true? Statements that suspects make to the police are not often used for
them, but they may be-and sometimes they are.
As has been argued here, the Hammond police sent Eagan
the wrong message (or at least an unnecessarily confused and
misleading one). What is far more important, however, is that,
in upholding those "pretzel-like warnings, " 33 the Supreme
Court sent law enforcement officers and front-line courts the
wrong message: Don't fret too much about the wording of the
warnings in the Miranda opinon. Don't worry. Be happy. You
have a good deal more room to play with the warnings than
most of you ever imagined.

31
(Emphasis added.) See the discussion in Commonwealth v. Singleton, 439 Pa.
185, 266 A.2d 753 (1970).
32

266 A.2d at 756.

33

Dissenting Justice Marshall so described the warnings given respondent Eagan
(quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 484 Pa. 349, 356, 339 A.2d 111, 115 (1979) (so
·
characterizing a similar warning)).
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